Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Economics Faculty Research and Publications

Economics, Department of

1984

Income Tax Evasion: Some Aggregate Empirical Evidence
Steven E. Crane
Marquette University, steven.crane@marquette.edu

Farrokh Nourzad
Marquette University, farrokh.nourzad@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/econ_fac
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Crane, Steven E. and Nourzad, Farrokh, "Income Tax Evasion: Some Aggregate Empirical Evidence" (1984).
Economics Faculty Research and Publications. 422.
https://epublications.marquette.edu/econ_fac/422

INCOME TAX EVASION: SOME AGGREGATE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Steven E. Crane and Farrokh Nourzad, Marquette University

tax revenue due t~ a reduction in one by
increasing the other.

It is well-known that every year a substantial amount of income evades income taxatiop.
This is obv ious 1 y a significant po 1 icy prob len1.
To salve this problem, the tax authorities must
have information about the factors that taxpayers consider when deciding how much income t e
report on their tax returns. The need for such
information has prompted a number of theoretical
and empirical studies of the evasion problem.

In contrast, ambiguous results emerge from
efforts to determine the direction of the re lationship between evasion and true income.
This
proves to depend on the assumptions ma de
regarding the factors mentioned above. For ex ample, Allingham and Sandmo [1, 1972] show tha t
with a proportional tax system, the effec t of a
change in true income on the level of rep orte d
income depends upon the magnitude of the penalty
relative to the size of unreported in co me.
Further, they demonstrate that higher income
causes the fraction of income reported to increase, decrease, or remain constant dep endi ng
upon whether relative risk aversion incr ea ses,
decreases, or remains constant as income
increases. On t .he other hand, Srinivas an [14,
1973] analyzes a risk neutral individua l co nfronted with a progressive tax system and fi nds
that the result depends upon whethe r the
probability of detection is an increasing o ra
decreasing func t ion of income.

In this paper sorne aggregate empirical evidence on income tax evasion in the U.S. is provided.
This is accomplished by specifying an
aggregate tax evasion function which is estimated
over the period 1947-78. The results provide (1)
empirical evidence which supports sorne of the
pred ict ions of the mi e rotheory, (2) ins ight s
where the theoretical results are indeterminant,
and (3) an indication of the sensitivity of a
measure of aggregate evasion to changes in the
aggregate variables which correspond to the
microtheoretical determinants of evasion.
The remainder of this paper is organized in
the following way. Section I contains background
information on the results reported in sorne of
the previous literature. In Section II, an empirical model is specified and estimated, and the
results are presented.
This is followed in
Section III by a brief discussion of sorne of the
possible implications of these results, along
with suggestions for further research.
l.

1

The theoretical work has also been inc apa ble
of offering determínate results regard ing the
relationship between the tax rate and optimal
tax evasion. This is because a change in the tax
rate produces incom2 and substitution ef fec ts,
which may reinforce or oppose each other. The
net effect depends on assumptions conc ern ing
attitude towards risk and the penalty fun ct ion.
As long as penalties are imposed on ev aded
income, the substitution effect is pos i ti ve,
meaning that higher tax rates result in increased
evasion, other things equal. This is because an
increase in the tax rate makes evasion mo re
profitable on the margin.
In contra st, the
income effect can be negative, zero, or positive
depending upon whether absolute risk aver sion iz
decreasing, constant, or increasing with inc ome .
Thus, the net effect is uncertain. Fu rt her ,
Yitzhaki [17, 1974] has shown that when penaltie s
are based on evaded taxes there is a ze ro
substitution effect. In light of these diver se
findings, no general statement can be mad e abo ut
the effect of the tax rate on the eva sion
decision.

BACKGROUND

Most theoretical studies in this field
involve microeconomic models of the individual's
income dec laration decision. Using a standard
decision-under-uncertainty framework, most analysts specify models that include four determinants of optimal income tax evasion. These are the
taxpayer's true income, his/her tax rate, the
penalty rate to which he/she would be subjected
if detecte~, and his/her perceived probability of
detect ion.
Within this common framework, analysts derive comparative static results under a variety
of assumptions concerning the factors affecting
the evasion decision. For example, different
assumptions are made regarding the individual
taxpayer's attitude towards risk, and thus
his/her objective function, the structure of the
tax system, and the properties of the penalty and
probability-of-detection functions.

In an effort to e lear up these ambiguit ies,
. several empirical studies have investigate d the
responsiveness of various evasio.n meas ures to
changes in the factors affecting the de cision to
evade. These studies, like their theo retic al
counterparts, typically have been undert aken at
the microeconomic level.
Most of them have
employed either a questionnaire o§ an experimental (game-simulation) approach. These stu dies
confirm the inverse relationship between evasion
and the two compliance variables, and tend to
suggest direct relationships between eva sion and
both income and the tax rate.

In general, sorne firm conclusions are
reached about the effect on evasion of both the
penalty rate and the probability of detection. It
is found that higher penalty rates and higher
probabilities of detection lead to lower evasion.
An implication of this is that, at the margin,
the two compliance policy tools can be considered
substitutes for each other. Consequently, it
should be possible to offset any fall in expected

Other empirical research has focused primar-

106

5TEVEN E. CHANE AND J.l'ARROKH . NOURZAD

ily on the measurement of either unreporteg
income or evaded taxes at the aggregate level.
Another procedure has been to measure the magnitude of tax ev as ion by a na 1 yz ing the traces it
leaves in the economy. 7 Both types of studies
are without theoretical underpinnings and make no
attempt to systematically analyze the factors
which affect tax evasion.
After reviewing this literature on tax evadon. we ha ve conc luded that there is something
missing. To our know 1 edge, no 1 ink has be en
estabilished between aggregate measures of
evasion and the theoretical work analyzing
evasion at the micro level. Clearly, the micro
analysis is essential for understanding the
pbenomenon of tax evasion. But it is also worth
remembering that the policymaker's ultimate
concern is tax evasion at the aggregate level.
II.

AGGREGATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

The primary determinants of income tax
evasion as identifed in the literature cited
above can be summarized using the following
implicit evasion funct ion

.O>

z

= f(Y,

e , n,

P).

In this function, Z is unreported income, Y is
true income, e is the margina 1 tax rate, n is the
penalty rate, and P is the probability of
detection.
In order to estímate (1) at the aggregate
leve 1, we need to spec ify it in terms of an
empirically testable equation, and quantify its
argumenta us ing aggregate mea sures. We begin by
postulating the following aggregate empirical
~vas ion equat ion
(2)

Zt ..; a 0 + a 1 lnYt + a 2 8 t + a 3IIt + a 4Pt + Ut,

vhere all variables are as defined above, t is
the time index, and U is the random disturbance
term with the usua 1 interpretat ion. The income
variable is expressed in logarithmic form in
order to recognize the probable nonl inearity due
to risk aversion.
For this equation to be consistent with the
findings of microtheory, the signs of a 3 and a4
ehould be negative. As for the signs of a 1 and
a2, microtheory provides no e lear expectation.
But casual observation, recent policy discuseions, and some of the empirical work at the
•~ero leve 1 might lead one to expect pos it i ve
ngns.
We are now in a position to relate the
argumenta in (2) to measurab 1 e aggregates. For
the dependent variable. Z, we use a version of
the Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Gap. The Gap is
the difference between the AGI figures derived
b~ the Bureau of Economic Ana lysis and the AGI
f~ure§ reported by the Internal Revenue Service
llS).
In effect, the Bureau AGI measures
reportable income, while the IRS figure measures
AGI actua 11 y reported.
Thus the . difference

(
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· between the two is a measure of unreported
income.
The Gap data used here have been
adjusted to eliminate the AGI reported on nontaxab 1 e returns and the AG I recei ved by those who
are not required to file or pay taxes.9 Since
these individuals have no incentive to evade
taxes. the adjusted AGI Gap figures should be
more accurate estimates of the amount of
unreported income.
It should be noted, however, that this
measure of evasion is by no means comprehensive.
There are many other "underground" income f 1 ows
from criminal activity, etc. that are not included in the AGI Gap. At best, it measures the
amount of "above ground" income that is not
reported. 0
In this aggregate specification of the evasien function, real personal income is used as a
measure of true income, Y. This measure has been
u sed, in part, because persona 1 in come is a
better measure of true income than AGI.
In
addition, specifying income in real terms allows
us to avoid the issue of inf lat ion. 11
There are several altern~tives for calculating an aggregate proxy for the tax rate
variable, 8.
One possibility is to use an
effective tax rate, calculated as the ratio of
tota 1 income tax revenue to some me asure of
income.
But, as Tanzi [ 15, 1980, p. 79] points
out,
[a] variable thus obtained suffers
from three shortcomings: f irst • the
numerator of the ratio uses actual tax
revenue rather than potential (without
evasion) revenue.
In other words, the
ratio may be reduced by t he existence
of e vas ion. Second • the denominator
may have been affected by the underreport ing of some income. Third, t he
ratio may remain unchanged even when
the rate structure is changing. This
last shortcoming is perhaps the most
serious, as it is the marginal tax rate
on a taxpayer's income--rather than the
average rate--that is more likely to
determine whether he evades the tax on
the marginal income.

.

.

Because of these cons iderat ions, a measure
of the effective tax rate is not used in this
paper.
Instead, we fo llow a se heme suggested by
~right [16, 1969] to construct a weighted average
{1argit_1a 1 tax rate ser.ie s which we ~e 1 iev e is
s uper1or to the effect1ve tax rate. 1
As Tanzi
[15. 1980, p. 79] puts it, "this series is 1 ike ly
t o prov ide year1y rates that may be e loser to
f.ome moda 1 average taxpayer's tax rate."
We use a measure of the average cost of
underreporting income as a proxy for the penalty
rate, JI.
The procedure used to construct this
measure is to express the additiona1 taxes, penalties. and interest assessed, as reported by the
Co mm i s s ion e r o f t he IR S [ 6 , 1 9 4 7- 7 8 ], a s a pe rcentage of the AGI Gap.
This ratio measures the
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effective cost (pe r dollar of unreported income)
The estimation resulta also ind icate t hat
incurred by detected evaders.
there is a positive relationship bet ween tax
evasion and tax rates. This can be exp lained as
There are a number of problema with this
follows.
Given that the subs i titution effect of
measure.
First, its numerator consista of
a tax rate change is posit ive, the tot a 1 e ffect
assessed evasion costs rather than potential
will depend on the sigo or the magnitud e of the
costs. Thus it may suffer from the same problema
income effect. As long as the income e ffec t is
as an effective tax rate. Second, this ratio
nonnegative, i.e., absolute risk aver sion is a
does not measure the statutory penalty rate,
nondecreas ing func t ion of income, t h e in come
which is what matters to the individual taxpayer.
effect will be positive, reinforcing the subUnfortunately, because statutory penalty rates
stitution effect. On the other hand , if the
~ary with the conditions of underrep~rting
income effect is negative, i.e., abso lute risk
(failure to file, failure to pay, negl1gence,
aversion decreases as income increases, the to tal
fraud, etc.), it is not possible to construct a
effect of an increase in the tax rate wi1 1 be
summary series for this variable as in the case
positive only if the substitutio n e f fect
of the tax rate. This, coupled with the fact that
dominates the income effect. Of th ese, the
detected evaders must not only pay penalties but
possibility of a positive income e ffec t is
also bear additional taxes and interest charges,
consistent with the above resu 1 t that over the
led us to use these cost ratios.
period of study there has been a diiect relat ionship between tax evasion and the leve l of real
Finally, an econometric problem with the
income.
cost-of-underreport ing variable must be recognized. This ratio contains the AGI Gap in the ·
The negative signs on the coeff icient s of
denom i nator, which may introduce some simulthe two po 1 icy parameters, the averag e co st of
taneity into the model. In recognition of this
evasion, and the probability of detec tion, are
potent ia 1 prob 1 em, a technique suggested by
in line
with the predictions of t he mic ro Durbin [2, 1954] is used to generate an instrutheoretic mode1s. It a1so appea:rs that these twc
ment wh i ch replaces this variable in the
po1icy tools are indeed substitute s for onl'
equation.
another as Allingham and Sandmo [1, 1 97 2 ] ha v;;
suggested. Thus there does appear to be a 1 inL
As an aggregate proxy for the probability of
between the predicted micro tax evasion behavior
detection, P, we use the data reported in the
and the macro aggregates.
Commissioner of the IRS [6, 1947-78] to construct
a three-year moving average of the ratio of the
To summarize, we find al1 variabl es in this
number of returns examined to the number of
empirical model to be statistica11y signific ant,
returns filed. Our reasoning is that an indiand have signs that are reasonab le and consi stent
vidual's subjective evaluation of the probability
with the microtheory. In addition, the model
of be i ng detected may in part depend on whether
explains 97% of the variation in unrep orted
or not he/she knows someone who has been audited
income.
in the recent past, and that this will be a
positive function of the percentage of returns
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
that were audited during the prev ious three
years. Gi ven that sorne evaders may choose not to
In v iew of the inherent 1 im i ta t i ons of th e
file returns at all, the denominator of this
data used in this study, we must exerc ise caution
var i able is likely to be understated, causing P
in drawing conclusions. Nevertheless, given the
to ove r state the probability of detection
dearth of information about ta x eva sion a t the
somewhat. However, we believe this to be the
aggregate level, it seems appropri a t e to make
best aggregate variable currently available.
some tentative statements.
Equation (2)
has been estimated over the
per io d 1947-78 using a second-order CochraneOrcutt autoregressive procedure. The fol1owing
results (with the absolute values of the
stat i stics in parentheses) have been obtained. 1

§-

zt =

-52.59 + 33.439 lnYt
(6.85) (13.97)

- o.199
(2.93)

R2 = 0.95

DW

=

2.21

lit

-

+

o.93o e t
(6.35)

1.475 pt
(3.90)

" .. -0.02 P • -0.56
P
1
2
(0.13)
(3.64)

These resulta indicate that there is a
pos it i v e relationship between tax evasion and
re al i ncome at the aggregate level. This may be
taken t o imply that, on the average and over the
per iod of s t udy, absolute risk aversion has been
a n i n c r eas i ng function of real income.

First, the positive relationshi p bet ween
real income and underreporting sugg ests that
evasion is a pro-cyc 1 ica1 phenomenon. This could
be because of a change in the comp o s itio n of
income, if more easily underreportab le i ncome
comprises a greater portian of real pers onal
income during expansiona. But regard l e ss of the
cause, our estimates indicate that, ot her t hings
equal and on the average, a one percent inc rease
in rea 1 income leads to an increase of more than
$33 billion in unreported income. Thi s probably
overstates the situation somewhat since pa rt of
the increase in unreported income may be due to
higher prices.
But the high1y s ignif icant
coefficient on real income indicates that underreporting increases during expansion.
The pro-cyc 1 ica 1 response of under repo rting
appears to be strong enough that its b udg etarY
, consequences shou ld not be neg 1 ec ted. Of cour_se,
the effect of rising underreport i n g du nng

.
.
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the progressive income -:t ·ax structure genera tes a
ezpansio~s may very ·well be overwhelmed by th e
nonlegislated tax increase.
However, this
¡rowth 1n revenues and the reduction in
argument would lose part of its appeal if it
expenditures that typically occur during this
could be shown that evasion increases with
phase of the business cyc le. Therefore,
inflation.
Intuitively, inflation may generate
additional analysis of the income elasticities
an incentive to evade taxes for two reasons.
of government revenues and expenditures is needed
First, inflation may cause nominal incomes to
before any firm conclusions can be drawn.
rise, subjecting some taxpayers to higher tax
ratea (bracket creep).
Second, inflation erodes
Second, our resulta offer some support for
the taxpayer's purchasing power and thus reduces
tbe argument that cutting marginal tax rates will
his/her standard of living. As far as we know,
lead to greater tax revenues. This is because
only F ishburn [3, 1981] has made a pre 1 iminary
tbe tax-cut hypothes is as sumes, among other
attempt to explicitly incorporate inflation into
tbings, that tax cuts reduce evasion. According
the standard evasion model. We believe that this
to our estimates, the total effect of a one
is an interesting and important issue that is
percentage point reduction in the tax rate over
deserving of additional theoretical and empirical
tbe samp le per iod is to increase reported income
analysis.
by more than $900 million. However, it is
questionable whether the resulting tax revenue
vill be sufficient to cover the revenue loss due
to the lower tax rate.
Further, tax cuts may
provide incentives which may lead to greater
income growth, which may, in turn, lead to more
evasion. Thus the support our analysis can provide for the tax-cut hypothesis is 1 imited. This
is another area where additional research is
called for.
Third, the magnitudes of the coefficients on
the two policy variables,
the penalty rate and
the probability of detection, indicate that,
other things equal, they are far from perfect
aubstitutes as far as revenue generation is concerned. The coefficient on P is more than seven
times that of II. According to our estimates, a
one percentage point increase in the probability
of detection wi 11 increase reported income by
nearly $1.5 bi 11 ion, while a one percentage point
increase in the penalty rate will only generate
an addit iona 1 $200 mi 11 ion of reported income.
The _finding that increasing the audit rate
i 8 a mor e e f fe e t i ve p o 1 i e y e a n be ex p 1 a in e d in
·part by the fact that over the period of study
,tbe mean value of this variable was relatively
lov, 3.5 percent. Starting with a low P, a small
increase will have a larger marginal impact on
unreported incof'le than l-ncñ . _, is already
relatively high.
Moreover, it is sensible that
high penalties coupled with low probabilities of
detection are not strong enough deterrents. As
lo 1m [ 8 , 1 9 7 3 , p. 2 6 6 ] p u t s i t , t h i s i s 1 i k e
"hang[ ing] tax evaders with probabi 1 ity zero."
On t he . o t he r han d , a h i g h proba b i 1 i t y o f
detect ion e ven wi th low moneta ry costs may be a
mor e e f f e e t i v e d e t erren t , par t 1 y d u e t o ·
DOnpecuniary costs as so e ia ted with prosecu t ion.
Of course, raising the probability of detection
through more frequent audits involves the use of
resources, while increasing the penalty rate is
virtually free of costs.
Therefore, a complete
aasessment of the relative effectiveness of these
tvo policy tools must account for not only gross
tax revenues, but also enforcement costs.
Additiona 1 research is needed to determine this
net return.
Finally, our analysis has followed the
theoretical literature and avoided the issue of
Ínflation.
The convent iona 1 wisdom is that the
&overnment will benefit from inflation because

FOOTNOTES
1. We wish to thank an anonymous referee
and the editor for their helpful comments.
2. Se e, for examp 1 e, A 11 ingham and Sandmo
[1, 1972], Srinivasan [14, 1973] and Yitzhaki
[17, 1974]. Other factors, not shared by all
models include the taxpayer's
sex, age,
education, marital status, etpnic background,
and the perceived inequality in the fiscal
system, to name a few.
3. For criticism of this proposition, see
Kolm [8, 1973].
4.
See Allingham and Sandmo [1, 1972].
Note, however, that in their model the choice
variable is the level of reported income rather
than unreported income or evaded taxes. Thus,
they find that the substitution effect is
negative and the income effect is positive, zero,
or negative depending upon whether absolute risk
aversion is decreasing, constant, or increasing
with income.
5. See, for instance, Friedland, Maital, and
Rutenberg [5, 1978], Mork [10, 1975], Spicer and
Becker [ 12, 1980], and Spicer and Lundstedt [ 13,
1976].
6. See, for instance, Long [9, 1980], and
Park [11, 1981]. These approaches are surveyed
and critically evaluated by Frey and Pommerehne
[4, 1982].
7. See, for instance, Tanzi [15, 1980].
8.
The BEA derives its AGI figures by
adjusting Personal Income for the conceptual
differences between Persona 1 and Adjusted Gross
Income. This is necessary because each measure
contains items that the other omits. Of course,
imperfections in the data mean that this residual
probably measures more than evaded income.
But
after surveying the available data, we concluded
that the AGI Gap was the most appropriate measure
for our purposes.
9.
This adjustment was made by Long [9,
1980, p. 108]. Long's data were through 1977.
The 1978 figure has been extrapolated.
The
resulta reported here are not materially affected
by this procedure.
10.
The Gap and other measures of tax
evasion are described and critically evaluated by
Frey and Pommerhene [4, 1982].
11.
Little is known about the effect of
inflation on tax evasion. Almost all of the
theoretical work has avoided the issue. To date,

110
THE JOURNAL OF ECÓNÓMICS, X 1984 ,
the only theoretica 1 work in this ar-ea há" be en ' :
1
8. KOLM, S. 'A Note on Optimum Tax Evasi on ,"
preliminary effort by Fishburn [3, 1981].
J. of Pub. Econ., 1973, 2, pp. 265-70 .
12. The tax rates are constructed from the
9. LONG, S. "The Internal Revenue Service :
data in the IRS [7, 1947-78].
Measuring Tax Offens es and Enforcemen t
13. We have also estimated the tax evasion
Response,
U.S. Department of Justice,
function using a double-log, a semi-1og with logs
1980.
on the righthand side, a semilog with the log on ·
the lefthand side, and a pure1y linear functional
10. MORK, K.A. "Income Tax Evasion: Sorne Emform.
The signa and significance ~f the
pírica! Evidence," Pub . Fin .~ 1975, 31 ,
estimated coefficients are generally consistent
pp. 70-76.
across these functional forms, although there is
the expected variation in the magnitudes of the
11. PARK, T.S. "The Re1ationship betwe en Pe restimated coefficients.
sonal Income and Adjusted Gr oss In come,
1947-78," Surv . Curr. Bus .~ 1981, 6 1, pp .
24-28, and p. 46.
l.
ALLINGHAM, M. G., and A. SA.i.~DMO. "In come Tax
12. SPICER, M.W. and L.A. BECKER. "Fis cal
Evasion: A Theoretica1 Ana1ysis," J. of Pub .
Inequity and Tax Evasion: An ExperimenEcon .~ 1972, 1, pp. 323-38.
tal Approach," Nat . Tax J .~ 1980 33
pp. 171-75.
,
'
2 . DURBIN, J. "Errors in Variables," Rev . of
Int. Stat . Inst .~ 1954, 1, pp. 23-32.
13. SPICER, M.W., and S.B. LUNDSTEDT. " Unde r standing Tax Evasion," Pub . Fin ., 19 76 , 31,
3. FISHBURN, G. "Tax Evasion and Inflation,"
pp. 295-305.
Aust. Econ . Pap .~ 1981, 20, pp. 325-32.
4.

FREY, B.S., and W.W. POMMERHENE. "Measuring the Hidden Economy," in V. Tanzi, ed.,

The Underground Economy in the United
Sta tes and Abroad~ Lexington Books, 1982,

14.

15.

pp. 3-27.
5.

FRIEDLAND, N., S. MAITAL, andA. RUTENBERG.
"A Simu1ation Study of In come Tax Evasion,"
J . of Pub . Econ.~ 1978, 10, pp. 107-16.

6.

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Annual Report:
Commissioner of the IRS , Washington, D. C.,

16.

Government Printing Office, the 1947-78
issues.

7.

. Statistics of Income--Individual
R e turns~

Washington, D.C., Government
Printing Office, the 1947-78 issues.

SRINIVASAN, T.N. "Tax Evasion: A Mode1 ," J .
pp~ 339-46.

of Pub. Econ., 1973, 2 ,

17.

TANZI V. "Underground Economy and Tax Evasion in the United States: Estimat es a nd
Implications," Banca Na zionale del Lavoro
Quart. Rev .~ 1980, reprinted in V. Tanzi ,
ed., The Underground Economy in the Uni ted
States and Abroad~ Lexington Books, 1982 ,
pp. 69-92.
WRIGHT, C. "Saving and the Interest Ra te, "
in A. C. Harberger and M.J. Bai1ey, eds .,
Th e Taxation of Income from Capital ~ The
Brookings Institute, 1 969, pp. 275-300 .
YITZHAKI, S. "A Note on In come Ta x Evas ion :
A Theoretica1 Ana1ysis," J . of Pub . Econ .~
1974, 3, pp. 201-2.

